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McKEE, Chief Judge. 
                                              





A. Factual Background 
Since we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the background of 
this case, we discuss the events leading to this appeal only briefly.  In April 2010, law 
enforcement officials in West Chester, Pennsylvania obtained authorization to conduct a 
wiretap on a cell phone used by Vincent Marchant.  The investigation revealed that 
Marchant was actively selling powder and crack cocaine and that his stock was being 
supplied by Appellant Adam Scott.1 
Marchant was arrested on June 2, 2010 and thereafter confirmed that Scott was 
supplying him with illegal drugs.  On May 18, 2010, law enforcement officials obtained 
authorization to conduct a wiretap on two cell phones used by Scott.  As the wiretap 
investigation continued, law enforcement officials began to conduct physical 
surveillance, including following Scott’s car.  However, Scott appeared to notice that he 
was being followed and took measures to evade the surveillance.  He also destroyed five 
of his cell phones, and thus all communications from the two cell phones that law 
enforcement officials had been monitoring ceased. 
Law enforcement officials were subsequently able to reestablish physical 
surveillance outside the home of Trinity Jennings, where Scott had previously been seen.  
                                              
1 Marchant began dealing with Scott in February 2009.  Until May 2010, Scott was Marchant’s only supplier.  Even 
when Marchant started buying from other people, he characterized Scott as his “main supplier.”  Marchant bought 
from Scott on a weekly basis, with a regular order of 4.5 ounces of cocaine and 62 grams of crack, although 
sometimes he bought as much as 13 ounces of cocaine in a single transaction.  Typically, Scott and Marchant met in 
person to make their transactions.  However, on one occasion, Scott left the drugs for Marchant with Darryl Naylor, 
who then delivered them to Marchant. 
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Investigators also began to rely on Darryl Naylor.2  His conversations with Scott had 
been intercepted on the Scott wiretaps, and Naylor thereafter agreed to cooperate with 
law enforcement.  Naylor identified Scott’s Everhart Road apartment, where investigators 
also set up physical surveillance.  Scott was seen coming and going from this apartment 
building several times. 
On September 15, 2010, investigators were alerted by another police department 
that Scott was operating a car registered to Monique Herndon.  West Chester police 
officers eventually stopped Scott for a traffic code violation and obtained his consent to 
search the car.  A drug detection dog was brought to the scene and alerted to the presence 
of narcotics, but none were found in the brief search.  However, the officers did find what 
appeared to be an electronically controlled trigger for a hidden compartment under the 
dashboard and, therefore, seized the car.  Police discovered a hidden compartment used to 
transport drugs while searching that car pursuant to a search warrant. 
After being stopped, Scott reportedly called Naylor and expressed concern that the 
officers had found the hidden compartment in the car.  Scott also told Naylor that he was 
going back to his apartment to clean up, as he was concerned that the officers knew 
where he lived.  He also told Naylor that he would subsequently be going to the Spare 
Rib bar in West Chester.  Naylor conveyed this information to law enforcement. 
                                              
2 Scott and Naylor became friends in 2005.  In 2008, Naylor leased a storefront, an apartment, and a party hall for 
two joint business ventures with Scott.  However, when the business ventures proved unsuccessful, the pair began to 
use the property for cooking, packaging, and selling drugs.  In the drug scheme, Scott had the majority of customers. 
While Naylor had a few of his own, he primarily assisted Scott with his customers.  Naylor helped cook and package 
the drugs and also drove and accompanied Scott and served as a lookout for some transactions.  Scott and Naylor 
sold drugs from the storefront for more than a year. 
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Late that night, Scott was arrested at the Spare Rib bar, where officers recovered 
$985 in cash, cell phones, and a key to the Everhart Road apartment.  A subsequent 
search of the Everhart Road apartment pursuant to a search warrant disclosed crack 
cocaine, marijuana, a loaded .32 caliber Keltec handgun, eleven cell phones, over 
$15,000 worth of jewelry, and $29,689 in rubber-banded stacks of cash.  Police also 
recovered paraphernalia associated with drug distribution and sales as well as plastic bags 
containing crack and marijuana. 
B. District Court Proceedings 
Thereafter, a federal grand jury returned an indictment3 charging Scott on five of 
the eleven counts: 
 Count One charged Scott with conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or 
more of cocaine and 280 grams or more of cocaine base (“crack”), in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; 
 
 Count Seven charged Scott with distribution of 28 grams or more of 
cocaine base (“crack”), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and (b)(1)(B); 
 
 Count Nine charged Scott with possession with intent to distribute cocaine 
base (“crack”), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and (b)(1)(C); 
 
 Count Ten charged Scott with possession of a firearm in furtherance of a 
drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1); and 
 
 Count Eleven charged Scott as a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 
 
                                              
3 Marchant was a co-defendant in the indictment.  He pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more 
of cocaine and 280 grams or more of cocaine base (“crack”), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and five counts of 
distribution of cocaine and crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). 
5 
 
A jury subsequently convicted Scott on each of the counts in which he was named, 
and Scott was ultimately sentenced to a total of 300 months incarceration followed by a 
period of supervised release. This appeal followed.4 
II. 
 We address each of Scott’s claims of error in turn.  
A. Whether there exists a variance between the indictment and the proof. 
 1. Standard of Review 
“We exercise plenary review over properly preserved claims of . . . variance.”  
United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 531 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. 
Daraio, 445 F.3d 253, 259 (3d Cir. 2006)).  However, where such a claim is raised for 
the first time in a post-trial motion, we review for plain error.  Id. (citing United States v. 
Tiller, 302 F.3d 98, 105 (3d Cir. 2002)). 
Plain error review requires a four-step inquiry, as follows: 
First, there must be an error or defect—some sort of deviation from a legal 
rule . . . .  Second, the legal error must be clear or obvious, rather than 
subject to reasonable dispute.  Third, the error must have affected the 
appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means he must 
demonstrate that it affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.  
Fourth and finally, if the above three prongs are satisfied, the court of 
appeals has the discretion to remedy the error—discretion which ought to 
be exercised only if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or 
public reputation of judicial proceedings. 
 
Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 
U.S. 725, 732–36 (1993)) (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted). 
                                              
4 We have jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 
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“[T]he plain-error exception to the contemporaneous-objection rule is to be used 
sparingly, solely in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would 
otherwise result.”  United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985) (quoting United States 
v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 n.14 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 2. Discussion 
Scott contends that his conviction for conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more 
of cocaine and 280 grams or more of crack should be reversed because of the existence of 
a prejudicial variance between the indictment and the proof.  He claims that “Naylor’s 
testimony failed to support a single conspiracy . . . . Instead, it tended to show the 
existence of two distinct conspiracies, thus resulting in a fatal variance from the 
Indictment.”  (Appellant Br. 26.) 
A variance exists “where the charging terms [of the Indictment] are unchanged, 
but the evidence at trial proves facts materially different from those alleged in the 
indictment.”  United States v. Castro, 776 F.2d 1118, 1121 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing United 
States v. Somers, 496 F.2d 723, 743 n.38 (3d Cir. 1974)).  “To prevail . . . [the appellant] 
must show (1) that there was a variance between the indictment and the proof adduced at 
trial and (2) that the variance prejudiced some substantial right.”  United States v. Balter, 
91 F.3d 427, 441 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Adams, 759 F.2d 1099, 1109 (3d 
Cir. 1985)).   
 “Where a single conspiracy is alleged in the indictment, there is a variance if the 
evidence at trial proves only the existence of multiple conspiracies.”  United States v. 
Kelly, 892 F.2d 255, 258 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing United States v. Smith, 789 F.2d 196, 200 
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(3d Cir. 1986)).  “We will sustain the jury’s verdict if there is substantial evidence, 
viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, to support a finding of a single 
conspiracy.”  United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 345 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Smith, 789 
F.2d at 200). 
“To prove a conspiracy, the government must establish a unity of purpose between 
the alleged conspirators, an intent to achieve a common goal, and an agreement to work 
together toward that goal.”  United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 197 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(citing United States v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 824, 829 (3d Cir. 1999)).  In determining 
whether there is a single conspiracy or multiple conspiracies, we consider three factors: 
“(1) whether there was a common goal among the conspirators; (2) whether the 
agreement contemplated bringing to pass a continuous result that will not continue 
without the continuous cooperation of the conspirators; and (3) the extent to which the 
participants overlap in the various dealings.”  United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 287 
(3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Kelly, 892 F.2d at 259) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
“The government need not prove that each defendant knew all of the conspiracy’s 
details, goals, or other participants.”  Gibbs, 190 F.3d at 197 (citing United States v. 
Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d 587, 593 (3d Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds by United 
States v. Price, 13 F.3d 711, 727 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
 “[A] simple buyer-seller relationship, without any prior or contemporaneous 
understanding beyond the sales agreement itself, is insufficient to establish that the buyer 
was a member of the seller’s conspiracy.”  Id. (citing United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 
309, 324–25 (3d Cir. 1992)).  However, “even an occasional supplier (and by implication 
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an occasional buyer for redistribution) can be shown to be a member of the conspiracy by 
evidence, direct or inferential, of knowledge that she or he was part of a larger 
operation.”  Price, 13 F.3d at 728 (citing Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d at 594). 
[W]here [an alleged coconspirator]’s only involvement in the conspiracy 
appears to be drug purchases, courts have looked to the surrounding 
circumstances to determine whether the defendant is a mere buyer who had 
such limited dealings with the conspiracy that he cannot be held to be a 
conspirator, or whether he has knowledge of the conspiracy to the extent 
that his drug purchases are circumstantial evidence of his intent to join that 
conspiracy. 
 
Gibbs, 190 F.3d at 199. 
Scott contends that “the evidence showed two distinct conspiracies with the 
appellant, Scott, as the main supplier or hub of the conspiracy, and Marchant and Naylor 
as separate spokes in the conspiracy” with no “rim” connecting the separate spokes.  
(Appellant Br. 27–28.)  However, the evidence supports the inference that there was, in 
fact, a single conspiracy. 
The conspiracy between Scott and Naylor was more than just a relationship 
between a buyer and seller.  Naylor was a principal and trusted associate of Scott.  Scott 
and Naylor had been friends for years, had attempted to start legitimate business ventures 
together, and found their way into drug dealing together.  Naylor helped Scott cook 
cocaine into crack and to package these drugs for sale.  (App. 735–36.)  Naylor also 
generally helped Scott with his drug customers.  (App. 736–37.) 
The extent of Marchant’s participation in the conspiracy is more than enough 
evidence of his intent to join the conspiracy between Scott and Naylor.  A substantial 
amount of drugs was moved by Marchant.  He had a standing order with Scott, and he 
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had previously purchased drugs on credit.  Scott and Naylor’s drug scheme was also 
substantially dependent on Marchant.  Marchant was Scott’s “horse,” meaning that he 
moved a majority of the drugs.  (App. 758–59.) Likewise, Marchant got most of his drugs 
from Scott.  (App. 529–30.)   
Not only was Naylor aware of Marchant’s identity as Scott’s customer, but he had 
delivered the drugs to Marchant on Scott’s behalf.  (App. 759–60.)  Significantly, 
Marchant called Naylor, not Scott, to set up that particular deal.  (App. 760.) 
When Marchant was arrested, Scott was “pretty shook” and told Naylor that he 
“lost [his] arm,” which Naylor interpreted as “he lost a major part of what he was doing.”  
(App. 764–65.)  The relationship between Scott and Naylor was such that since Marchant 
was a major part of what Scott was doing, he was also a major part of what Naylor was 
doing.  Thus, the evidence is more than sufficient to show that Scott, Naylor, and 
Marchant were participants in a single conspiracy. 
The common goal here is clear: to distribute crack and cocaine. Scott’s remarks 
following Marchant’s arrest indicate that Scott and Naylor’s operation was largely 
dependent on Marchant moving their drugs: he was “a major part” of what they were 
doing. There was overlap both in time and in action between Naylor and Marchant.  Scott 
and Naylor were involved in the conspiracy from 2008 until Scott’s arrest in 2010.  
Marchant joined this conspiracy in January 2009, ending with his arrest in June 2010.  
Naylor and Marchant were aware of each other’s role in the conspiracy and had met 
before to complete a drug transaction.  
Accordingly, there is no variance and Scott’s conviction on Count One is affirmed. 
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B. Whether there was sufficient evidence for the jury to determine that Scott 
conspired to distribute or possess with the intent to distribute five kilograms or 
more of cocaine and 280 grams or more of crack. 
 
 1. Standard of Review 
 Where sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, “we examine the totality of the 
evidence, both direct and circumstantial, and must credit all available inferences in favor 
of the government.”  United States v. Sparrow, 371 F.3d 851, 852 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting 
United States v. Gambone, 314 F.3d 163, 170 (3d Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
  “We review the record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine 
whether any rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”  United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 430 (3d Cir. 2013) (en 
banc) (quoting United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 133 (3d Cir. 2005)) (internal 
quotation marks and alterations omitted).  Thus, this is a “particularly deferential 
standard,” where we “must be ever vigilant not to usurp the role of the jury by . . . 
assigning weight to the evidence, or by substituting our judgment for that of the jury.”  
Id. (quoting Brodie, 403 F.3d at 133) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 
 2. Discussion 
 The evidence clearly supports the jury’s finding that Scott conspired to distribute 
or possess with the intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and 280 grams 
or more of crack.  Marchant’s testimony alone supports this conclusion. 
 Marchant began dealing with Scott in February 2009 and continued until his arrest 
on June 2, 2010.  The last known sale was on May 7, 2010. Marchant testified that at his 
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first meeting with Scott, he purchased 62 grams of powder cocaine and 62 grams of 
crack.  (App. 520.)  After this initial sale, Marchant testified that he regularly purchased 
drugs from Scott once a week.  (App. 524–25.)  Marchant stated that it was “pretty much 
guarantee[d]” that he would meet with Scott for a drug transaction on a weekly basis.  
(App. 526.)  For these transactions, Marchant would purchase his standing order of 126 
grams of powder cocaine and 62 grams of crack.  (App. 525.)  Based on their weekly 
schedule, a rational juror could infer that there were approximately 66 subsequent 
purchases in this time period between Scott and Marchant.  Following this inference, a 
rational jury could conclude that Scott sold Marchant 66 orders of 126 grams of powder 
cocaine and 62 grams of crack following their initial transaction, which amounts to 8,316 
grams of powder cocaine and 4,092 grams of crack—well over the jury’s requisite 
finding for conviction of five kilograms (5000 grams) of cocaine and 280 grams of crack.  
 While we recognize that Marchant testified that there were times when he would 
go a week without seeing Scott and that sometimes his order varied, we reiterate that we 
view the record in the light most favorable to the government under a particularly 
deferential standard: as long as the jury’s conclusion passes the bare rationality test, i.e., 
it is not completely irrational, we must uphold the jury’s verdict.  The jury’s verdict 
clearly passed this threshold here.  Accordingly, we will again affirm the verdict as to 
Count One. 
C. Whether there was sufficient evidence to prove that Scott possessed a firearm in 
furtherance of a drug trafficking activity. 
 
 1. Standard of Review 
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 We exercise the same standard of review as exercised under Section B supra.   
 2. Discussion  
 Scott alleges that the evidence is insufficient to establish that the firearm recovered 
from the Everhart Road apartment was possessed in furtherance of a drug trafficking 
offense.  It is Scott’s contention that the conviction in Count Ten was based solely on 
facts showing that Scott was merely a drug dealer in possession of a firearm and that 
there was no evidence demonstrating that the firearm was used to advance or promote his 
drug dealing activities.  We disagree. 
 We do, however, agree that, under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), the “mere presence” of a 
gun is insufficient to sustain a conviction. Sparrow, 371 F.3d at 853.  Instead, “the 
evidence must demonstrate that possession of the firearm advanced or helped forward a 
drug trafficking crime.”  Id. (citing United States v. Lomax, 293 F.3d 701, 705 (4th Cir. 
2002)).  Courts are to consider the following factors in determining whether a firearm 
advanced a drug trafficking crime: 
[T]he type of drug activity that is being conducted, accessibility of the 
firearm, the type of the weapon, whether the weapon is stolen, the status of 
the possession (legitimate or illegal), whether the gun is loaded, proximity 
to drugs or drug profits, and the time and circumstances under which the 
gun is found. 
 
Id. (quoting United States v. Ceballos-Torres, 218 F.3d 409, 414–15 (5th Cir. 2000)). 
 This case is strikingly similar to United States v. Sparrow, in which the appellant 
also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence.  Id. at 852.  There, as here, we rejected 
that challenge. See id. at 852, 854.  In Sparrow, the appellant sold marijuana out of a 
convenience store.  Id. at 851.  After conducting surveillance of the store, the police 
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obtained a search warrant and found “a concealed compartment under the floor tiles 
behind the counter.”  Id.  Concealed in the compartment were “nine large Ziploc bags of 
marijuana, $140 in cash and a loaded Jennings .22 caliber pistol.”  Id. at 851–52.  The 
appellant did not deny possession of the gun.  Id. at 852. 
 We held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain possession of a firearm in 
furtherance of a drug-related activity predominantly because: (1) the appellant illegally 
possessed the firearm, as a prior felon; (2) the firearm was loaded; (3) the firearm was 
“kept in the same floor compartment as nine large Ziploc bags of marijuana and $140 in 
cash”; and (4) while not necessarily easily accessible, the firearm was “strategically 
located.”  Id. at 854. 
 Scott is also a prior felon and kept the loaded gun in a dresser with a substantial 
amount of crack and marijuana, jewelry, and $29,689 in cash.  Specifically, the firearm 
was found in the space underneath the bottom drawer of the dresser where the jewelry 
and much of the cash was found.  In Sparrow, we found that the firearm “was placed so 
that it would be immediately available for [the appellant’s] protection whenever he 
retrieved drugs or money from the floor compartment.  Therefore, it [was] reasonable to 
assume the firearm was placed in the floor compartment for that purpose and was 
possessed in furtherance of [the appellant’s] drug activities.”  Id.  The same reasoning 
applies here.  Accordingly, the District Court did not err in finding that Scott possessed a 
firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking activity. 
D. Whether the District Court erred in admitting into evidence wiretap tapes, which 





 1. Factual and Procedural Background 
The government used wiretap recordings of thirteen phone calls between Scott and 
Marchant from the wiretaps authorized for two of Scott’s phones. 
Prior to trial, Scott’s attorney requested that the government produce all 
documentation regarding the Title III wiretaps.  (App. 51.)  In response, the government 
provided additional discovery and stated that all Title III documentation regarding the 
wiretaps had been produced, with the exception of inventory notices.  (App. 57.)  
Subsequently, the District Court conducted a hearing on the admissibility of the wiretaps, 
but ultimately allowed that evidence to be admitted.  
After the trial, Scott informed his newly appointed lawyer of his unfulfilled 
discovery requests, which included the sealing orders for the wiretaps.  Significantly, 
Scott concedes that he did not file a pretrial motion to suppress the wiretaps. 
Proceeding pro se, Scott filed a post-trial motion to compel discovery and 
requested an evidentiary hearing on that motion.  He argued that “the wiretap sealing 
orders had never been disclosed and that the [D]istrict [C]ourt erred in admitting the 
wiretap recordings without knowing if they were properly sealed.”  (Appellant Br. 54.)  
In response, the government conceded a discovery violation because it had not produced 
the wiretap sealing orders as requested. However, the government contended that Scott 




On July 2, 2013, the government sent the sealing orders to Scott’s standby counsel 
by e-mail.  However, on August 2, 2013, the government learned that standby counsel 
was unable to forward the e-mail to Scott because Scott was then in custody at the 
Federal Detention Center.  Consequently, the information was hand-delivered to Scott. 
Thus, prior to sentencing on August 8, 2013, Scott had possession of the sealing orders 
for about a week.  However, he did not file a motion to suppress the wiretaps before 
sentencing or make an oral motion to suppress at sentencing. 
After a post-trial hearing, the District Court denied Scott’s motion for further 
discovery and for an evidentiary hearing on the wiretap sealing issue.  Scott now appears 
to make two distinct claims of error pertaining to that issue. First, Scott contends that the 
District Court erred because the “wiretaps and all evidence derived therefrom should 
have been suppressed.”  (Appellant Br. 59.)  Second, it is Scott’s contention on appeal 
that “the [D]istrict [C]ourt erred by not conducting a full evidentiary hearing on the 
sealing issue where such a hearing would have revealed that the wiretaps were sealed in 
an untimely fashion with no sufficient excuse to justify the delay.”  (Appellant Br. 55.) 
 2. Waiver 
 The government correctly argues that any claim of error arising from the failure to 
timely pursue suppression of this evidence has been waived. 
 Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 12(b)(3)(C) provides that a motion to suppress evidence “must 
be raised by pretrial motion if the basis for the motion is then reasonably available . . . .” 
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This Court has held that, under Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 12(b)(3)(C), “a suppression argument 
raised for the first time on appeal is waived . . . absent good cause.”5  United States v. 
Rose, 538 F.3d 175, 182 (3d Cir. 2008).  “This rule applies not only when defendants 
altogether fail to raise any suppression arguments in the District Court, but also when 
defendants fail to raise particular arguments later advanced on appeal.”  United States v. 
Joseph, 730 F.3d 336, 338 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 As previously noted, Scott was not sent the sealing orders until after trial and after 
his conviction.  On May 17, 2013, when Scott filed a motion for new trial, Scott defended 
his failure to file a motion to suppress, stating: “How could the defense file a motion to 
suppress Scott[’]s [wiretaps] on sealing and inventory grounds if the prosecution has 
never turned over proof of the actual seal or the inventory letters/notices[?]  Or at least a 
written explanation of [their] absence[?]”6  (Suppl. App. 2.)  As Scott did not have the 
sealing orders in his possession before trial, the basis for the motion was not “reasonably 
available” to him, and we find good cause for Scott not making a pre-trial motion to 
suppress. 
 However, Scott received the sealing orders approximately a week prior to his 
sentencing on August 8, 2013.  It is uncontested that Scott did not file a motion to 
suppress the wiretaps between receiving them and his sentencing, nor did he make an oral 
                                              
5 While “Rose concerned evidence which the defendant sought to suppress under the Fourth Amendment[,] . . . in 
light of the expansive language of Rule 12(b)(3)(C), which applies broadly to ‘a motion to suppress,’” this Court has 
found it “equally appropriate to apply this waiver rule in the Title III context.”  United States v. Berrios, 676 F.3d 
118, 130 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 
6 Further, Scott contends that, if the evidence was disclosed before trial, “the defense would have moved to suppress 




motion to suppress the wiretaps at sentencing.  Thus, we must determine whether there is 
good cause for Scott’s failure to file a motion to suppress the wiretaps once the sealing 
orders were in his possession.  
On the motions hearing on August 8, 2013, while a motion to suppress was not 
filed, Scott did raise a suppression argument, thus making the District Court aware of the 
suppression issue.  Scott argued: 
[I]f my wiretaps were suppressed, it would have had an effect on the trial. It 
would have an effect on the evidence seized from the apartment . . . if these 
wiretaps were suppressed and there was never any motion to file 
suppressing the wiretaps. Now that I have the sealing orders, there is 
discrepancy issues in the sealing orders and if the wiretaps were suppressed 
it would have had a determination on the guilt or innocence for the trial. 
 
(App. 1341.)  
 In response, the District Court stated: “You can make the motion, but there’s more 
than just the fact that they weren’t sealed that would reflect upon whether or not they 
would have been suppressed.  So your argument at this point is merely speculative.”  
(App. 1342) (emphasis added).  Scott thus replied: “The reason this is speculative is that I 
didn’t have it before trial to file a motion to suppress on it.”  (App. 1344.)  Further, he 
stated: “If I would have had the evidence when I requested it, your Honor, your Honor 
could have made the decision before trial when it was requested to grant or deny the 
suppression of the wiretaps. There was never a motion to file.”  (Id.) 
 The District Court explicitly told Scott that he “c[ould] make the motion.” 
Nonetheless, Scott never made the motion to suppress.  Thus, with the District Court’s 
prompting to make the motion and his possession of the sealing orders, Scott has not 
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shown good cause for not making the motion to suppress.  Thus, we will not consider 
whether the wiretaps and all evidence derived from them should have been suppressed.  
 Further, we will not consider whether an evidentiary hearing should have been 
held on the motion to suppress.  
 “We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of an evidentiary 
hearing on a motion to suppress.”  United States v. Hines, 628 F.3d 101, 104 (3d Cir. 
2010).  “Such rulings are ordinarily committed to a district court’s sound discretion, 
which we reverse only in rare circumstances.”  Id. at 105. 
Rule 12(b)(3)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permits 
defendants to file ‘motions to suppress evidence’ before trial, but 
evidentiary hearings on such motions are not granted as a matter of course.  
To require a hearing, a suppression motion must raise issues of fact 
material to the resolution of the defendant’s constitutional claim.  A motion 
to suppress requires an evidentiary hearing only if the motion is sufficiently 
specific, non-conjectural, and detailed to enable the court to conclude that 
(1) the defendant has presented a colorable constitutional claim, and (2) 
there are disputed issues of material fact that will affect the outcome of the 
motion to suppress. 
 
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  Accordingly, since Scott never 
actually moved to suppress—despite being prompted to do so by the court—we do not 
find that the District Court abused its discretion in failing to provide an evidentiary 
hearing. 
E. Whether the government’s failure to provide Scott with the complete criminal 
history of one of its primary witnesses, Darryl Naylor, constituted a due process 
violation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 
 1. Standard of Review 
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“Because a Brady claim presents questions of law as well as questions of fact, we   
[ ] conduct a de novo review of the district court’s conclusions of law as well as a ‘clearly 
erroneous’ review of any findings of fact where appropriate.”  United States v. Perdomo, 
929 F.2d 967, 969 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing Carter v. Rafferty, 826 F.2d 1299, 1306 (3d Cir. 
1987)). 
 2. Discussion 
 Naylor was a key witness for the government at trial.  The following impeachment 
evidence for Naylor was available to the defense prior to, or before the end of trial: 
 Three prior drug trafficking convictions 
 Three prior drug convictions, two for distribution and one for possession 
 Two arrests for selling drugs to a confidential informant 
 Pending federal drug charges 
 A theft conviction 
 A recent DUI conviction 
 Recent possession of cocaine (never charged) 
 
At trial, Naylor also disclosed that he was a drug addict, had served time in prison, had 
problems with alcohol abuse, and other evidence that certainly allowed Scott to impeach 
his testimony.  
 After trial, the government received Naylor’s PSR and learned that Naylor had a 
more extensive criminal record than had been disclosed at or before trial.  The following 
impeaching information about Naylor was thus only discovered after trial: 
 Four drug trafficking charges, rather than three 
 Three possession charges, rather than one 
 Two theft convictions, rather than one 
 Two DUI convictions, rather than one 
 A burglary conviction 




 Scott “contends that Naylor’s undisclosed criminal history was material to his 
defense and that its non-disclosure prejudiced his trial by limiting trial counsel’s ability to 
adequately cross-examine Naylor.”  (Appellant Br. 61.)  However, at sentencing, while 
Scott was proceeding pro se, he stated: 
There were other issues I wanted to raise, but I didn’t feel that—well, I was 
advised that in posttrial motions that it would not be proper to raise, some 
of it was arguments, so I didn’t file the issue about Darryl Naylor’s criminal 
history not being turned over or a lot of other things, ineffective assistance 
or things like that, so more or less these are my post trial motions . . . . 
 
(App. 1365.)  The government accordingly argues that, “[b]ecause Scott explicitly 
waived any issue relating to the late disclosure of parts of Naylor’s criminal history, his 
Brady claim is not reviewable . . . .” (Appellee Br. 54.)   
 In his reply brief, Scott acknowledges this procedural defect, but asks this Court to 
consider the claim anyway because he was a pro se litigant.   We have stated that “we 
tend to be flexible when applying procedural rules to pro se litigants . . . .”  Mala v. 
Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2013).  “And at least on one 
occasion, we have refused to apply the doctrine of appellate waiver when dealing with a 
pro se litigant.”  Id. (citing Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153 n.2 (3d Cir. 1993)).  
However, we need not decide whether this leniency should apply here, because the 
evidence Scott complains of was not material when its value is assessed in context with 
the information that Scott did have at his disposal 
The materiality of Brady material depends almost entirely on the value of 
the evidence relative to the other evidence mustered by the state.  
Suppressed evidence that would be cumulative of other evidence or would 
be used to impeach testimony of a witness whose account is strongly 
21 
 
corroborated is generally not considered material for Brady purposes.  
Conversely, however, undisclosed evidence that would seriously undermine 
the testimony of a key witness may be considered material when it relates 
to an essential issue or the testimony lacks strong corroboration. 
 
Johnson v. Folino, 705 F.3d 117, 129 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). 
 Impeachment evidence falls squarely within the Brady rule.  See Giglio v. United 
States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972).  “Suppressed impeachment evidence is immaterial 
under Brady, however, if the evidence is cumulative or impeaches on a collateral issue.” 
Conley v. United States, 415 F.3d 183, 189 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. 
Dumas, 207 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 2000)).  “Suppressed impeachment evidence, if 
cumulative of similar impeachment evidence used at trial (or available to the [defendant] 
but not used) is superfluous and therefore has little, if any, probative value.”  Id. (citing 
United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239, 246 (7th Cir. 1995)). 
The government argues that “Naylor was already substantially impeached at trial.  
The jury heard that Naylor had a long and sordid history of drug dealing, drug use, and 
theft.”  (Appellee Br. 57.)  Further, “[t]he jurors knew that Naylor’s history was 
thoroughly unsavory, and that he was cooperating to gain a benefit for himself, and they 
believed him anyway.”  (Appellee Br. 57–58.)  We agree. Accordingly, regardless of 
whether the Brady claim was waived by Scott, he cannot establish a violation on this 
record.  
III. 
 Accordingly, for all of the above reasons, we will affirm.  
